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Abstract
The past decade has seen a sizeable increase in scholarship onKant’sReligion.
Yet, unlike the centuries of debate that inform our study of his other major
works, scholarship on the Religion is still just in its infancy. As such, it is in a
particularly vulnerable state where errorsmade now could hinder scholarship
for decades to come. It is the purpose of this article to mitigate one such
danger, a danger issuing from the widely assumed view that the Religion is
shaped by ‘two experiments’. I will begin with a survey of the four current
interpretations of the experiments, and then propose one further interpreta-
tion, one that hopefully will help dismantle this alleged ‘conundrum’ and
thereby help scholarship on the Religion move beyond this early misstep.
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1. Introduction
An interpretative battle has been waging over how to best understand the
so-called ‘Two Experiments’ of Kant’s Religion within the Boundaries of
Mere Reason. According to the main combatants in this battle, how one
interprets these experiments ‘matters a great deal to how the remaining
interpretation of Religion unfolds’ (Firestone 2015); and particularly for
those committed to the so-called ‘afﬁrmative’ reading of the Religion,1
‘the two experiments can have a profound effect on whether Kant’s
position is compatible with Christianity’ (Palmquist 2012: 343).
Unfortunately, those who put the greatest interpretative weight on the Two
Experiments do not give sufﬁcient consideration to the passage in the
Second Preface that serves as its basis. More often than not, their discus-
sions focus instead on critiques of their opponents, critiques that rely more
on their broader religious and philosophical commitments than careful
Kantian Review, 22, 1, 107–131 © Kantian Review, 2017
doi:10.1017/S136941541600039X
VOLUME 22 – 1 KANTIAN REVIEW | 107
analysis of the text itself. In this article, I will provide such an analysis, one
that will in the end raise doubts about the overall interpretative relevance of
the Two Experiments. This is because, ﬁrst, the passage at issue is simply
too vague to be utilized as it has been by some as a hermeneutical key to the
whole of theReligion; and second, as will be proposed, there may in fact be
no ‘experiment’ intended by Kant, never mind two.
Before we turn to the passage in question and the view that will here be
proposed, let us begin with an examination of the interpretations of the
Two Experiments most recognized in the current literature. We will then
turn to the text itself, attending both to the passage where the alleged
Two Experiments are intimated and the discussion that surrounds it.
What will there be offered is a further reading of the passage, one that has
not yet been considered in the literature, one that may help us recognize
that this battle may very well not be worth our time. Accordingly, this
article seeks to euthanize the debate that gave it rise.
2. The Interpretations
The fourth sentence of the Preface to the second edition of the Religion
begins as follows: ‘Aus diesem Standpunkte kann ich nun auch den
zweiten Versuch machen’ (6: 12).2 Given Kant’s mention of a ‘second
experiment’ (zweiten Versuch, 6: 12), readers have understandably
assumed that there is also a ﬁrst, albeit unstated ‘experiment’ as well. But
what exactly that experiment involves, and how it differs from the second
that is enumerated, stands as one of the many contested elements of the
Religion. Since the main combatants within this battle do not build their
interpretations from speciﬁc textual details, we will defer such an analysis
until later in this article. For now, however, our procedure will be as
follows. First, we will present how each of the current interpreters renders
the Two Experiments. Second, we will consider how they apply the
distinction to one particular test case: Kant’s discussion of the moral
‘prototype’ (Urbild) at the opening of Part Two. Third, we will sum-
marize their respective accounts of the experiments, highlighting key
similarities and differences. In each case, we will, as issues arise, discuss
how each interpreter’s reading of the Two Experiments interacts with
their broader understanding of the Religion as a whole.
Religion as Translation
Let us begin our survey with what has come to be known as the ‘Religion
as Translation’ (RaT) interpretation.3 This view is attributed primarily to
John Hare (1996) and Bernard Reardon (1988), though only the former
explicitly takes on the First/Second Experiment distinction. According to
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Hare, the First Experiment concerns the representation of ‘the relation
between special revelation and reason… as the relation to between two
concentric circles, with special revelation being the part of the larger
circle not included in the smaller one, and the pure religion of reason
being on the inside’ (Hare 1996: 40). More speciﬁcally, RaT takes the
First Experiment as concerned with the domain of overlap between
‘Biblical Theology’ (BT) and the ‘Pure Rational System of Religion’
(PRSR).4 The Second Experiment then seeks ‘to show that certain items
in the outer circle lead back within the inner circle when looked at in the
light of, or translated in terms of moral concepts’ (Hare 1996: 40). That
is, outside what is often referred to as ‘general revelation’, which includes
the moral teaching of the Bible and various matters of natural theology,
the ‘special revelation’ of the outer domain involves doctrines given to us
through revelation alone. These include ‘the central claims of Christianity
in the traditional order of creation, fall, redemption, and second coming’
(Hare 1996: 40).
RaT further characterizes the Second Experiment as ‘a kind of raiding
party; leaving the inner circle, we investigate the outer circle to see if we
can bring back any doctrines found there into the domain of pure reason
by translating them under appropriate constraints’ (Hare 1996: 40–1).
In other words, the question of the Second Experiment is, according to
RaT, to determine whether special revelation also contains elements of
the PRSR, though contained in a manner less than apparent. The core
aim of the Religion thus becomes to investigate this possibility in order to
see whether ‘the central claims of Christianity’ can be understood as – or
‘translated’ into – tenets of the PRSR. This will become relevant as we
move forward, but note that Hare does not consider the Second
Experiment as providing a case for enlarging the PRSR, such as to include
contents only available through special revelation. He instead takes it to
be a ‘translation’ (some accuse him of a reduction) whereby Kant culls
from special revelation its purely rational elements.
As illustration of this ‘translation’, we may consider the suggestion
offered in Part Two of the Religion that in order to see in the Gospels
a moral example we can follow, we should not elevate Jesus into
‘a supernaturally begotten human being’, one ‘above every frailty of
human nature’ (6: 64). Instead, we should ‘translate’ the Gospels into a
representation of human moral potential; though in doing so, we gain
a practical reason to not represent Jesus as any more than human.
In other words, what, according to RaT, primarily matters to the project
of theReligion is the practical value of religious doctrine. With regards to
the ‘two experiments ’ of kant ’s religion
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theoretical reason, we may be agnostic regarding the supernatural
elements of Christology; but with regards to practical reason, we ﬁnd the
Gospels to be of value insofar as they provide for us a representation of
human moral potential.
It is far from obvious that Reardon approaches the Religion through
similar exercises in ‘translation’, but be that as it may, we have here one
of the interpretative camps found within the contemporary battleﬁeld:
First ExperimentRaT: the construction of the PRSR (as coordinate
with what of BT falls within general revelation).5
Second ExperimentRaT: the ‘raid’ on the outer domain of special
revelation so as to translate it into the PRSR.
While Hare is not especially clear about the locus of the First Experiment,
others (Firestone and Jacobs 2008: 115; Palmquist 2015: 34) presume his
view to be that it precedes the Religion itself, taking place instead in the
Canon of the First Critique, the Groundwork, Second Critique, and
elsewhere as Kant constructs his moral theory, occasionally compares it
to divine command theory, introduces the Highest Good and its
postulates of God and immortality and even explores the problem of
moral evil as found in his 1791 ‘Theodicy’ essay. By contrast, the Second
Experiment is understood as taking place in the Religion, for we ﬁnd in
each of its four parts, a ‘raid’ on the ‘the central claims of Christianity’.
To some interpreters, this reading of the Religion is unsatisfying on the
grounds that ‘the pure religion of reason gains nothing from translating
Christianity’ (Firestone and Jacobs 2008: 79).6 Yet it is not so obvious
that this should be seen as an objection. First of all, even if RaT’s critics
are correct that its rendering of the Religion entails that the PRSR gains
no new content from BT, that may very well reinforce the merits of the
PRSR as a ‘complete religion’ (6: 162).7
Second, if we view the main aim of the Religion to be a comparison
between the PRSR and BT, that still speaks to its value, particularly for
someone of Kant’s own time, someone who wished to reﬂect on whether
or not ‘between reason and Scripture there is, not only compatibility but
also unity’ (6: 12). If we remind ourselves that Kant himself was brought
up in a Lutheran Pietist household and, by numerous accountings,
suffered miserably through his many years at the strict Pietist Collegium
Fridericianum,8 it is hardly beyond the pale to imagine within the spec-
trum of human interests that he would want to explore how the
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intellectual views of his adult life might correlate to the doctrines that
shaped his youth (as well as, of course, a signiﬁcant share of the Western
world).
Third, if the project of the Religion is understood as having practical
import, seeking to promote the PRSR to an audience straddled
between their Christian upbringing and Enlightenment commitments,
a meaningful case can be made that the Religion was written to offer a
path for religious reform. From Lessing’s explorations of the ‘ugly broad
ditch’ between ‘the accidental truths of history’ and ‘the necessary truths
of reason’, to the Jeffersonian Bible, composed to separate Christianity
from its ‘mystical cover’, to Schleiermacher and the Liberal Christian
movement who regard the Religion as one of their founding documents,
RaT’s interpretation of the Religion situates it quite ﬁrmly within the
central theological debates of the period.
Religion as Symbol
The next interpretation of the Two Experiments emerges primarily from
Stephen Palmquist’s Kant’s Critical Religion. Palmquist there presents
the First Experiment as pertaining to the Religion’s ‘transcendental
elements’ (Palmquist 2000: 142), and then some years later describes it as
an exposition of ‘the essence of religion in terms of “an a priori rational
concept”’ (Palmquist 2015: 34). The First Experiment thus ‘aims at
constructing a “pure rational system of religion”’ (Palmquist 2000: 143).
The Second Experiment then ‘aims at assessing one particular empirical
religion by “start[ing] from some alleged revelation or other and …
examin[ing] [it] … in the light of moral concepts”’ (Palmquist 2000:
143). Palmquist subsequently describes the Second Experiment as an
attempt ‘to discern the extent to which Christianity exhibits this a priori
concept (i.e., fulﬁls the necessary conditions for “actual religion”)’
(Palmquist 2015: 34). He also, as we will soon discuss more fully,
ultimately divides the Second Experiment into two distinct stages.
One initial point of contrast between RaT and RaS (Religion as Symbol)
is that the latter characterizes both the First and Second Experiments as
advancing incrementally through each of the Religion’s four parts, with
the earlier sections of each part devoted to the First Experiment, and the
later sections devoted to the Second Experiment (Palmquist 2000: 144).
Also unlike RaT, RaS does not take the First Experiment to be just the
principles of morality and natural religion found elsewhere in the Kantian
corpus. RaS, rather, takes this experiment, and thus the Religion as
a whole, as moving beyond the moral and religious topics offered in
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earlier texts. Each part thus begins with the First Experiment and its
contribution to the expanding PRSR; each part then moves on to the
Second Experiment, exploring this new content in relation to BT.
For example, in his Comprehensive Commentary Palmquist writes: ‘the
ﬁrst major task of Kant’s ﬁrst experiment’ is found in Part One’s account
of ‘what bare reason justiﬁes us to say about the essential conditions
of human nature’; he then presents the question of ‘how closely the
traditional Christian understanding of evil conforms to this rational
standard’ as an issue for the Second Experiment (Palmquist 2015: 106).
Hence, in Part One, the First Experiment proffers such aspects of our
moral nature as the rigourism of a supreme maxim that either makes us
morally good or morally evil, the presence of a propensity to evil, three
predispositions to the good, and how these various elements relate to one
another. Part One then moves on to the Second Experiment’s query as
to ‘how closely the traditional Christian understanding of evil conforms
to this rational standard’. The story of Genesis is thus ‘tested’ by Kant to
determine how well it comports with the PRSR. Some of its elements are
thereby rejected (e.g. the historicity of its account of our origins, the
biological inheritance of original sin), and some afﬁrmed, though,
Palmquist maintains, afﬁrmed in two very different ways.
First, and more straightforwardly, the biblical story is taken to contain
the essence of the rational account of moral evil presented by Kant earlier
in Part One. But second, the biblical story importantly supplements
rational religion, for according to RaS, since ‘human beings are not
purely rational beings … bare reason is unable to answer many of the
most important philosophical questions’ (Palmquist 2015: 116). RaS
thus takes quite seriously this added role of special revelation, for it ‘is
crucial for a proper understanding of his second experiment and hence of
the entire book’ (Palmquist 2015: 116).
Accordingly, RaS takes the Second Experiment as not just a test of how
well BT serves as vehicle for the PRSR. Likewise, it does not simply
seek to ‘translate’ BT into the PRSR. For rather, it also advocates for BT
(or more speciﬁcally, special revelation), as providing new and important
content for our religious lives. BT, therefore, does more than address ‘the
natural need of all human beings to demand for even the highest concepts
and grounds of reason something that the senses can hold on to’ (6: 109).
The claimmade byRaS is far more radical. Religious symbols are not just
imaginatively enhanced vehicles for the PRSR. 9 Instead, RaS ascribes to
BT a ‘mystical’ signiﬁcance: ‘the door to transcendence can be recognized
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by reason, but it cannot be opened’ (Palmquist 2015: 116). Religion as
Symbol thus treats BT and its symbols not just as vehicles for the PRSR,
but as passageway to something more.10
This dynamic, the movement from the First Experiment to each phase
of the Second Experiment, can be seen perhaps the most vividly in
RaS’s treatment of the Religion’s Christology. For as Palmquist states
quite directly: Kant’s ‘appeal to the biblical notion of “the Son of God”
cannot properly be understood without recognizing its grounding in
Kant’s second experiment’ (Palmquist 2015: 164). So, where the First
Experiment details the idea of a moral ‘archetype’ (Urbild), ‘available to
all human beings by virtue of their rational capacity’ (Palmquist 2015:
165), the Second Experiment not only then correlates this moral principle
with the Gospels, but also proposes that the Gospels speak to ‘what we
might call a Christ-sized “hole” in the heart of humanity’s rational
capacity’ (Palmquist 2015: 165).
As Kant explains, the rational ‘prototype’ (Urbild) is ‘present as model
already in our reason’ (6: 62), but according to RaS, it cannot on its own
function as a ‘motivating counterforce’ to our propensity to evil absent
Jesus’s historical example (Palmquist 2015: 165). This supplement is
needed because we otherwise would not be able to ‘believe we are
capable’ (Palmquist 2015: 166) of taking the step imposed on us by
Kant’s rigourism – i.e. either we prioritize self-interest over morality or
vice versa. There is no middle ground to the moral status of our
Gesinnung and thus its transformation ‘cannot be effected through
gradual reform but must rather be effected through a revolution in the
disposition of the human being’ (6: 47). Hence, one who has not
yet undergone this transformation, one whose fundamental maxim
prioritizes self-interest over morality, must undergo a revolution, a
revolution that presumably will not seem even possible, since from the
logic of self-interest, how could one ever choose to forgo it? The example
of Jesus is thus offered, according to RaS, as proof that it can be done.11
Insofar as it might be feared that Kant is here ‘merely importing Christian
notions into his supposedly rational system – that is, of letting the second
experiment dictate to the ﬁrst’ (Palmquist 2015: 165), Palmquist
responds with a surprising defence: here revelation is needed ‘out of the
necessity caused by its [reason’s] own limits’ (Palmquist 2015: 166). That
is, according to RaS, ‘had the Christian revelation never come to pass…
[we] may never have become aware of the archetype (Urbild)’ (Palmquist
2015: 166). RaS holds thereby that Kant ‘regarded the Christian Gospel
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as a genuine revelation’ (Palmquist 2015: 166). It provides for us not just
‘symbolic clothing’ for an otherwise deﬁcient ‘bare reason’, but further
content as well: content that ‘reason may never have been capable of
formulating’ (Palmquist 2015: 166), content that ‘empowers us to
“believe” in our own capacity to imitate the archetype of perfection’
(Palmquist 2015: 116).
While it may have ﬁrst seemed as if the main difference between Religion
as Translation and Religion as Symbol was just a matter of the First
Experiment’s locale (i.e. antecedent to the Religion or within the
Religion), Palmquist’s contention that the Second Experiment does not
merely test Christianity but shows the need for a religious supplement to
pure reason, marks out a clear difference between RaT and RaS.
Accordingly, we may regard his treatment of the Second Experiment as
having two stages: it ﬁrst ‘tests’ biblical theology, to assess the extent
to which it serves as vehicle for rational religion; but then it further
discovers that special revelation adds something to our moral vocation
that reason alone does not and cannot: a ground for belief that moral
transformation is possible. To summarize:
First ExperimentRaS: the construction of the PRSR.
Second ExperimentRaS – Part A: a study of the outer domain of
‘special revelation’ in order to ﬁnd within it the PRSR.
Second ExperimentRaS – Part B: a study of whether the outer
domain of ‘special revelation’ contains within it morally neces-
sary principles absent in the PRSR.
Religion as Vehicle
A third approach to the Two Experiments is tendered in Lawrence
Pasternack’s 2014 commentary on the Religion.12 In contrast to our
other interpreters, Pasternack prefers a more cautious approach to the
text, acknowledging that ‘Kant does not tell us what the ﬁrst experiment
is’ (Pasternack 2014: 79). Moreover, unlike most interpreters of the
Religion, Pasternack does not use the distinction as guide to his overall
interpretation. He approaches the Religion instead by way of its con-
tinuity with the broader corpus, emphasizing in particular the relevance
of the Highest Good to the Religion’s overall aims. As Pasternack
observes, we can see this connection made explicit in various locations,
including at the very opening of the Religion, where in its First Preface
Kant employs the Highest Good to motivate the claim that ‘“morality…
inevitably leads to religion” (6: 6)’ (Pasternack 2014: 79).
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In light of this approach, Pasternack sees less relevance to the First/
Second Experiment distinction, and what he does say is more reserved,
particularly with respect to the First Experiment. Instead of advancing a
speciﬁc view, he opts instead to accept the text as irresolvably vague, for
the only claim we can infer from it is that ‘whatever the ﬁrst experiment
is, it must be understood as conceptually or logically prior to the second’
(Pasternack 2014: 79). To Firestone however, this is a major shortcoming
in Pasternack’s commentary, for his reticence ‘leaves readers in the dark’
(Firestone 2015) as to ‘where one experiment begins and the other ends’
(Firestone 2015). Yet this is in fact part of Pasternack’s point: the text is
vague, and in the absence of Kant explicitly mentioning an ersten
Versuch, it is best to leave it an open question as to what he intended.
Pasternack does, nevertheless, grant that whatever (and wherever) this
First Experiment is, it must in some way relate to ‘the construction of the
pure rational system of religion from an a priori procedure rooted in
moral concepts’ (Pasternack 2014: 79). But more speciﬁc claims should
be regarded as no more than conjecture.
With regard to the Second Experiment, however, Pasternack is less
difﬁdent. He writes, for example, that it centrally involves a comparison
of ‘the elements of Historical Faith associated with “alleged revelation”
to the Pure Rational System of Religion’ (Pasternack 2014: 79). This,
comparison, however is evaluative, for he takes the Second Experiment
as doing more than offering a piecemeal comparison between the PRSR
and BT.
According to Pasternack, the Second Experiment is guided by a general
rule or ‘evaluative standard’ (Pasternack 2014: 80) according to which
any religious system, be it pure or historical, can be assessed. That rule he
proposes to be based upon Kant’s employment of ought implies can – and
more speciﬁcally, on the requirement that whatever is essential to our
becoming ‘well-pleasing to God’must be ‘convincingly communicated to
everyone whereas a historical faith, merely based on facts, can extend its
inﬂuence no further than the tidings relevant to a judgment on its cred-
ibility can reach’ (6:103). In other words, since the content of an alleged
revelation ‘can extend its inﬂuence’ only to a limited audience, whatever
is required of us in order to become ‘well-pleasing to God’ must be
available to one and all. Pasternack then draws from this that the PRSR,
as based upon reason alone, will therefore be adequate to ‘Saving Faith’
(Pasternack 2014: 80). Christianity, likewise, meets this test of being a
‘complete religion’, though that is, as theReligion documents, established
by virtue of what is shared between the PRSR and BT.
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Hence, Pasternack does not treat theReligion as either successful or failed
Christian apologetics. He rather reads it as a philosophical work, one
which explores how historical faith is to be understood in relation to
the PRSR. The Second Experiment examines the obvious test case:
Christianity, but it could just as well investigate other historical faiths.
Where those who read the Religion as Christian apologetics ignore or
brush off passages where Kant favourably compares other religions to the
PRSR (e.g. 6: 108, 111, 140), such passages are more salient to what
might be called Pasternack’s Religion as Vehicle (RaV) reading, for many
historical faiths can serve as vehicles for the PRSR. Such an ecumenical-
ism is, in fact, of considerable signiﬁcance according to RaV, insofar as
the second half of the Religion promotes a ‘Universal Church’ for all
humanity. For as Kant states: ‘There is only one (true) religion; but there
can be several kinds of faith… [and thus] one and the same true religion
can nevertheless be met with’ (6: 107).
Let us now look once again to the opening of Part Two, and see howRaV
renders Kant’s Christology. Quite in contrast to most readers of the
Religion, Pasternack sees little signiﬁcance in Kant’s use of Urbild.
Referencing the ﬁrst Critique, he writes: ‘Kant regards the hypostatiza-
tion of the Urbild to be an “exaggerated expression” (A318/B375).
Urbilder are, more mundanely, just entities of the mind, instruments of
regulative judgment through which “the understanding is directed
towards a certain goal” (A644/B672)’ (Pasternack 2014: 135). The
moral ‘prototype’ (Urbild) is thus just the ‘ideal of practical perfection’
(Pasternack 2014: 136), an ideal that ‘is present as model already in our
reason’ (6: 62), and so what the Gospels then offer is just a more ‘vivid
mode of representing’ our moral ideals (6: 83).
Hence, for RaV, questions about the historicity of the Bible are just not
relevant to its moral function; in fact, they can endanger that function
by fomenting what Kant calls ‘moral unbelief’ (see: 6: 63, 84, 120).
Moreover, in opposition to those who prefer to read the Religion as
Christian apologetics, Pasternack emphasizes that while ‘[w]e ﬁnd in the
Gospels a representation that helps us grasp moral perfection and so
helps guide us in our own efforts … we should not conﬂate this with a
metaphysical claim about the ideal becoming ﬂesh’ (Pasternack 2014:
136). Quite unlike the views proffered by others (especially RaA, as we
shall see below), RaV takes Kant to be agnostic about both the Gospels’
historicity and their supernaturalist claims. The aim of the Second
Experiment is thus similar to its portrayal by RaT: for Kant ‘did not see
himself as rejecting Christian doctrine, but rather getting to its core,
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a core that is also available to the Pure Rational System of Religion’
(Pasternack 2014: 165). In sum:
First ExperimentRaV: the construction of the PRSR.
Second ExperimentRaV: a study of ‘special revelation’ in order to
ﬁnd within it the PRSR.13
Religion as Apologetics
The fourth and most extraordinary reading of the Two Experiments
appears in Chris Firestone andNathan Jacobs’ seminal InDefense of Kant’s
Religion. According to these authors, there is no other viable explanation as
to why Kant would have written the Religion except in order to demon-
strate the truth of Christianity, a truth that Transcendental Idealism was
likewise created to serve. As discussed earlier, they attack RaT on the
grounds that its ‘translation’ project effectively makes the Religion into a
valueless text, for it ultimately concludes that ‘the pure religion of reason
gains nothing from translating Christianity’ (Firestone and Jacobs 2008:
79). Similarly, Firestone dismisses Pasternack’s interpretation of the
Religion as grounded on Kant’s doctrine of the Highest Good. While
Firestone concedes that Kant’s interest in the Highest Good can be used as
an explanation for why he would write about religion (since it is, for Kant,
by virtue of the Highest Good that ‘morality… inevitably leads to religion’,
6: 6), he nevertheless does not see this as explaining why Kant would write
about the Christian religion in particular (Firestone 2015).14
With regard to Palmquist’s RaS, their critique is less direct. Their
dismissal of RaT and RaV is based on their view that Kant would not
have had interest in exploring Christianity except in order to defend it.
Yet RaS just as much as Firestone and Jacobs’ Religion as Apologetics
(RaA) takes Kant’s Religion as showing that there is a genuine need for
special revelation. Their criticism seems to stem, instead, from their
dislike for Palmquist’s architectonic and what they see as his failure to
bring the so-called ‘conundrum’ literature of the 1980s and 1990s to the
forefront of his scholarship. Hence, while they could have found in
Palmquist an ally, stylistic differences occluded greater philosophical
kinship.
Where RaA and RaS differ is more in the details of their apologetics and
in how they see the Two Experiments unfolding through the text.
Recalling our previous summary of RaS, each of the Religion’s four parts
contain both experiments. Each part begins with the First Experiment’s
construction of the PRSR, and then each part turns to the Second
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Experiment, moving from an initial comparison between the PRSR and
BT, then on to a defence of some elements of BT absent from the PRSR. In
contrast to this, RaA claims that the First Experiment develops through
the Religion’s ﬁrst three parts, with the Second Experiment taking place
solely in Part Four. According to this view, the First Experiment turns to
special revelation, identifying ‘the doctrine of radical evil, his proto-
typical theology, and his vision of the ethical commonwealth’ as the key
‘advances on his critical philosophy, without which it is incomplete’
(Firestone and Jacobs 2008: 115). In other words, the First Experiment
discloses for us the items of special revelation that Kant’s Critical
philosophy requires, but could not come to via our natural capacities.15
They then characterize the Second Experiment, and so the Religion’s
fourth part, as setting out Kant’s account of the philosophical foundation
for special revelation as well as ‘the apparatus surrounding this founda-
tion’ (Firestone and Jacobs 2008: 226). The authors, unfortunately, do
not tell us what this philosophical foundation looks like, or how we can
circumvent Part Four’s claim that ‘nowhere in experience can we recog-
nize a supersensible object’ (6: 174). In fact, in the very pages where
Firestone and Jacobs claim that Kant sets up this foundation he, rather,
quite forcefully protests that any proposed ‘method’ for identifying ‘inner
revelation … always remains a self-deception detrimental to religion’.
And even more bluntly: ‘To want to perceive heavenly inﬂuence is a kind
of madness’ (6: 174). So, while they claim that ‘Kant’s emphasis in Book
Four, [is]… on the priority of belief in Christianity’ (Firestone and Jacobs
2008: 226), the text seems far more a polemic against ‘requiring a
revelation as necessary to religion’ (6: 178).
The prospects for RaA are clearly gruesome. But let us nevertheless
complete our study by once again exploring Kant’s Christology in light of
its reading of the Two Experiments.
UnlikeRaT,RaS andRaV,RaA treats Kant’s Christology as taking place
solely within the First Experiment. But as their rendering of the First
Experiment is actually quite close to the RaS two-stage Second Experi-
ment, it is unsurprising that they follow RaS by also regarding the
prototype (Urbild) as grounds for moral hope. Nonethless, there are
differences in some details.
According to RaS, in order for us to believe in our moral potential, we
must have an example of an actual moral success. Jesus thus serves as this
example, requiring, however, Jesus to then be just like us, as ‘a naturally
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begotten human being’ (6: 63). For Firestone and Jacobs, however, the
picture is very different. As they are more orthodox in their Christian
commitments, Firestone and Jacobs seek to preserve the divinity of Jesus
Christ as well as to disallow the possibility that any human being could
overcome the state of sin through just rational principles. To them,
‘Kant’s premises in Book One undercut the possibility of such [moral]
renewal’ (Firestone and Jacobs 2008: 156), and so they maintain that
‘Kant must cognize a moral ideal outside of and distinct from our corrupt
species’ (Firestone and Jacobs 2008: 156). The prototype of Part Two,
which they describe as ‘a transcendental entity’, thus stands outside our
fallen nature (Firestone and Jacobs 2008: 156).
Put differently, Firestone and Jacobs follow Augustinian convention by
regarding original sin in terms of a corruption of our own powers as
agents; and so for them, original sin makes moral conduct impossible for
us, since we are as a result, ‘slaves to sin’.16 Accordingly, they present
Kant as likewise following Augustinian convention, such that ‘only the
descent of the prototype can restore the possibility of genuine moral
freedom’ (Firestone and Jacobs 2008: 166). For RaA, then, Kant follows
the distinctly Christian balance between a pessimism about human
nature and the optimism conveyed by the Good News. That optimism,
however, is not to be gleaned from our own natures, but rather
from a being made intelligible to us through what they call Kant’s
‘Transcendental Platonism’.
AsRaA presents the opening of Part Two of theReligion, the prototype is
not, as it was portrayed by RaV, a mere intentional object ‘present as
model already in our reason’ (6: 62). It is also not, as characterized by
RaS, a rational model of what is morally possible for all of us, though
made possible through the example of the historical Jesus. The prototype,
according to RaA is, rather, a supernatural being, one that, despite their
already dubious ‘Transcendental Platonism’, is not quite as much
Platonic as Scotist: ‘We also ﬁnd that this idea exists within God, not
merely as a concept but as a being, or substance, that proceeds from
God’s own being’ (Firestone and Jacobs 2008: 158).
While on the one hand, they draw from RaS that this ideal provides the
rest of humanity with moral hope, they differ in that they follow the
Augustinian view of our passive reception of grace, such that the aid we
receive is through ‘a gracious condescension on the prototype’s part’
(Firestone and Jacobs 2008: 164). Hence, as they read Kant, we cannot
raise ourselves up, but rather must just hope for help ‘from without’
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(Firestone and Jacobs 2008: 164); and, all the more radically as a reading
of Kant, they assert that ‘only the decent of the prototype can restore the
possibility of genuine moral freedom’ (Firestone and Jacobs 2008: 166).
Let us now see what can be said of the Two Experiments in light of the
above. Clearly, their reading of Part Two depends upon a number of
theses shockingly at odds with how Kant is understood by most philo-
sophers. They endorse a loosely Scotist metaphysics; they reject the
freedom of the will (for unless saved, we are slaves to sin); they reject
autonomy (for we cannot through our own powers act from duty).
Hence, in order to fulﬁl the First Experiment, whose aim is to bring Kant
into alignment with Christian orthodoxy, they forsake widely established
features of both the theoretical and practical sides of his Critical
philosophy. Of course, if we do not read Part One’s treatment of original
sin as endorsing its Augustinian variant, Kant would not then place us in
the pickle whereby we would need Christ’s aid. But, as Firestone and
Jacobs routinely protest, Kant would never have written the Religion
except as Christian apologetics. Though little is ultimately explained with
regards to the Second Experiment’s alleged demonstration of the Kantian
foundations of special revelation, we have been able to make relatively
legible how they approach the First Experiment. In sum:
First ExperimentRaA: an exposition of what contributions are
made by ‘special revelation’ to the PRSR.
Second ExperimentRaA: a Kantian defense of ‘special revelation’,
its ‘apparatus’ and foundations.
Review of Findings
Before moving on to the new interpretation that will be tendered below,
let us take stock of our ﬁndings thus far.What should be most apparent is
that, with the exception of Firestone and Jacobs’ RaA, there is a rough
consensus between the other main interpreters of the Two Experiments.
RaT, RaS and RaV all concur that the First Experiment has something to
do with the construction of the PRSR, though there is some debate as to
its speciﬁc content and locale. Similarly, all but RaA portray the Second
Experiment as attending to the scope of overlap between the PRSR and
special revelation, though again, there are various differences in the
details. Perhaps it is worth noting here that Pluhar and di Giovanni
(via personal correspondence) fall into this near-consensus, for they both
see the First Experiment as related to the construction of the PRSR, and
the Second Experiment as directed to its relationship to special revelation.
lawrence pasternack
120 | KANTIAN REVIEW VOLUME 22 – 1
It is, however, ironic that with so much overlap in how the Two
Experiments are understood, there is so much disagreement as to Kant’s
ultimate goals in the Religion, particularly, as Palmquist notes, on
‘whether Kant’s position is compatible with Christianity’ (Palmquist
2015: 343).
According to Hare, the Religion is internally vitiated by a conﬂict
between Kant’s ‘Stoic Maxim’, according to which one’s moral achieve-
ments need be solely the result of one’s own efforts, and his sympathies
with the doctrine of original sin, which seem to demand an appeal to
grace. By contrast, Pasternack sees the Religion as internally consistent,
though defends that consistency on the grounds of Kant’s divergence
from core Augustinian precepts, while both Palmquist and Firestone and
Jacobs take the Religion as appropriating all that is needed from
Christianity, even (in the case of the latter authors) at the expense of the
received views regarding Kant’s ethics.
What I think the above discussion helps to show is that there may be far
less signiﬁcance to how one reads the Two Experiments than what
Firestone and Jacobs and Palmquist assert. It seems much more the case
that interpreters come to an understanding of the Religion’s overall
structure, themes, and goals, and then apply their understanding of the
text to the passage at 6: 12. This becomes all the more evident when we
attend to the fact that the passage does not explicitly enumerate the
alleged ersten Versuch, nor clearly tell us what this ersten Versuch
involves. Even what is says about the zweiten Versuch is still nowhere
near as robust as some have claimed. While 6: 12–13 does tell us that the
Religion investigates whether there is ‘not only compatibility but also
unity’ between some portion of BT and the PRSR, it offers little to settle
key normative issues, including the necessary and sufﬁcient criteria for a
‘complete religion’, whether rational religion depends (because of our
weaknesses) on a historical vehicle (as per RaV), or whether it depends
(because of its intrinsic weaknesses) upon further revelatory content
(as per RaS and RaA).
In other words, despite how much some interpreters have put on the
shoulders of the alleged Two Experiments of 6: 12, it is best to look else-
where for answers to the more disputed questions regarding how – or
if – Kant appraises Christianity. The Two Experiments cannot bear the
interpretative weight, for even if there were a complete consensus as to how
to read the scant passage at 6: 12, many of the most important and most
disputed evaluative questions would not there ﬁnd their answers.17
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These reservations, however, are just preliminaries for the view to which
we now turn, one that will cut even more deeply against the relevance of
the passage from which the debate over the Two Experiments has arisen.
For as we shall now discuss, it may very well be the case that this entire
debate ﬂows out of an utterly banal misunderstanding.
3. The Second Preface
To set the stage for the view I would like to advance, we will ﬁrst work
through the opening sentences of the Preface to the second edition of the
Religion, the alleged source-text for the Two Experiments. Readers may,
of course, wish to consult their preferred version of the passage, for I will
here summarize most sentences rather than quote them in full.
First, I presume that the ﬁrst two sentences of the Second Preface are
non-controversial. For they merely state that the second edition includes
some minor corrections plus supplements marked by the dagger
symbol ‘†’. The lengthy third sentence is then where the fun begins. The
signiﬁcance of its opening Von dem Titel dieses Werks is often
overlooked, as is the parenthetical remark which follows, where Kant
notes that concerns have been raised about ‘the intension hidden under’
the Religion’s title. Readers instead focus on what comes next in the
sentence: Kant’s well-known metaphor of the two concentric spheres,
with the wider sphere (BT) containing the more narrow (PRSR). What is
typically missed, or at least forgotten, is that the imagery here is issued by
Kant for the purposes of explaining the Religion’s title. And, as we shall
see, how the title is understood is, in turn, of importance to how zweiten
Versuch is understood.
With Kant’s depiction of the two spheres, the wider (BT) inscribing the
more narrow (PRSR), we can then envision what Kant meant by the title:
what of the wider sphere falls within the boundaries/limits of the more
narrow. Or, stated more fully, Kant describes two concentric spheres,
with the wider sphere of historical faith containing the more narrow
sphere of rational religion. In virtue of this containment relation, there
will be some subset of the larger domain that overlaps or falls with the
boundaries of the more narrow. Hence, the title references that portion of
the wider sphere of historical religion that falls within the boundaries/
limits of the more narrow domain of rational religion.
It is then, following this sentence, with its explanation of the title of
the Religion by way of the above imagery, where we ﬁnd: ‘Aus diesem
Standpunkte kann ich nun auch den zweiten Versuch machen’.
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The sentence then continues with Kant explaining what he is going to do
by way of this ‘standpoint’: ‘namely, to start from some alleged revelation
or other and, abstracting from the pure religion of reason (so far as it
constitutes a system on its own), to hold fragments of this revelation, as a
historical system, up to moral concepts, and see whether it does not lead
back to the same pure rational system of religion’ (6: 13).
After some further elaboration, Kant then offers what is often understood
as the success condition for the Second Experiment: if the PRSR is ‘suf-
ﬁcient to genuine religion … then we shall be able to say that between
reason and Scripture there is, not only compatibility but also unity, so
that whoever follows the one (under the guidance of moral concepts) will
not fail to come across the other as well’ (6: 12–13). Then, as the last
sentence of this long paragraph, Kant discusses the opposing outcome,
i.e. if no overlap is found between a historical faith and the PRSR. In such
a case, the key result would be two incompatible systems of ‘a religion
and a cult’, which, ‘like oil and water’, cannot stably combine, leaving the
‘purely moral religion (the religion of reason) [to] ﬂoat to the top’ (6: 13).
In sum, the opening of the Preface to the second edition, after a brief
point of orthography, responds to concerns regarding the meaning of the
title of the Religion, leading then to an account of what, ‘from this
standpoint’, the Religion aims to determine: namely, whether or not
there is to be found any ‘unity’ (Einigkeit) between the PRSR and
a subset of BT.
The Two Experiments
What I am now not going to do is to explain how the above can be
separated into the First Experiment and the Second Experiment. Instead,
I am now going to argue that it is a sheer misunderstanding of the text to
think that anything in the above sets out a division between a so-called
First and Second Experiment. Or more precisely: my view is that Kant
does not in the Preface to the second edition of theReligion assert that the
project of the Religion is guided by two distinct experiments. The culprit
here, the cause of all this confusion, is in how the key passage has been
translated: Aus diesem Standpunkte kann ich nun auch den zweiten
Versuch machen.18
In their 1934 translation of the Religion, Greene/Hudson chose the
English ‘experiment’ for the German Versuch. Then, in 1996 and 2009
respectively, di Giovanni and Pluhar each followed this convention,
likewise using ‘experiment’ here. This, I think, is a mistake … or rather
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the mistake, the one that is centrally responsible for our current inter-
pretative conundrum and the many hours that have been devoted to it.
In order to see the weaknesses of this choice of terms, consider, ﬁrst, that
Kant could have used the cognate Experiment, as he does often enough
elsewhere (e.g. Bxiii, 5: 92, 7: 98). But he did not. He instead used
Versuch, a term which could, as Pluhar in fact footnotes at 6: 9, just as
well be translated as the more gentle ‘attempt’.19
Second, consider that the passage in question comes on the heels of
Kant explaining the meaning behind the title of the Religion – and
Versuch was, during the period, routinely used in titles to mean
‘attempt’ or even ‘essay’. Locke’s Essay, for example, was translated as
Versuch über den menschlichen Verstand. We also have Tetens’s
1777 Philosophische Versuche über die menschliche Natur und ihre
Entwicklung, Fichte’s 1792 Versuch einer Kritik aller Offenbarung,
Reinhold’s 1795 Versuch einer neuen Theorie des Vorstellungsvermö-
gens, and so on.
But even more to the point, Kant himself was clearly fond of using Versuch
in his own titles, including:
Allgemeine Naturgeschichte und Theorie des Himmels oder
Versuch von der Verfassung und dem mechanischen Ursprunge des
ganzenWeltgebäudes nach Newtonischen Grundsätzen abgehandelt
(1755)
Versuch einiger Betrachtungen über den Optimismus (1759)
Versuch den Begriff der negativen Größen in die Weltweisheit
einzuführen (1763)
Versuch über die Krankheiten des Kopfes (1764)
And, in the year just prior to the Religion, his ‘Theodicy’ essay bears
the title: Über das Mißlingen aller philosophischen Versuche in der
Theodicee.
A third point to consider is that there are numerous passages where Kant
refers to what he is writing, has just written or is about to write as
Versuch, and if one reviews their context, they are for good reason
translated as ‘attempt’. Anyone familiar with German will agree that it is
non-controversial that Versuch often means ‘attempt’, and likewise
grant that the term is routinely used in contexts where an author is about
to embark on some exposition, explication, defence or argument.
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Throughout the Kantian corpus, such uses of Versuch read in the
hundreds, but let me offer here just a modest sampling:
The third chapter shall be an attempt (Versuch) at this . . . (1: 118)
Of those who presume to judge works of the mind, it is a minority
which boldly looks at the attempt (Versuch) as a whole . . . (2: 67)
Accordingly, if the reader will bear with me, I shall venture such
an attempt (Versuch) here . . . (2: 334)
Now the concern of this critique of pure speculative reason
consists in that attempt (Versuch) to transform the accepted
procedure of metaphysics. (Bxxii)
Physicotheology is the attempt (Versuch) of reason to infer
from the ends of nature (which can be cognized only empirically)
to the supreme cause of nature and its properties. A moral
theology (ethicotheology) would be the attempt (Versuch)
to infer from the moral ends of rational beings in nature
(which can be cognized a priori) to that cause and its properties.
(5: 436)
But it can easily be demonstrated, and has already been under-
stood for some time, that this attempt (Versuch) to bring unity
into the multiplicity of faculties, although undertaken in a
genuinely philosophical spirit, is futile. (20: 206).20
In light of the three broad points so far discussed (more will follow), let us
consider the passage in revised di Giovanni translation. Aus diesem
Standpunkte kann ich nun auch den zweiten Versuch machen: ‘From this
standpoint can I now also make this second attempt’.
With the word changed to ‘attempt’, a new possibility thus begins to take
form. Recall that the passage appears towards the opening of the Preface
to the second edition, a Preface that is centrally about why Kant decided
to compose a second edition. Hence, it may be that the meaning here is
quite simply that Kant is now issuing this second attempt to engage in a
comparison between the PRSR and BT. Now consider as our fourth piece
of evidence Kant’s use of Versuch through the Religion’s ﬁrst and second
Prefaces:
* The Preface to the ﬁrst edition uses Versuch to describe the project of
the text, a comparison between the ‘pure philosophical doctrine of
religion’ and ‘biblical theology’.
the ‘two experiments ’ of kant ’s religion
VOLUME 22 – 1 KANTIAN REVIEW | 125
* The Preface to the second edition uses zweiten Versuch to describe the
project of the text, a comparison between the ‘pure religion of reason’
and ‘alleged revelation’.
* The Preface to the ﬁrst edition uses the non-enumerated Versuch to
describe the project, with no mention of any other Versuch.
* The Preface to the second edition uses the enumerated zweiten
Versuch to describe the project, with no mention of any other
Versuch – any other Versuch, that is, other than the Versuch of the
Preface to the ﬁrst edition: for after Kant discusses what seems the
success condition of the zweiten Versuch (i.e. whether the PRSR and BT
have unity), he writes: ‘I noted in the ﬁrst Preface that this uniﬁcation
(Vereinigung), or the attempt (Versuch) at it, is a task to which the
philosophical researcher of the religion has perfect right’ (6: 13).
Fifth, and ﬁnally, let us look at what each of the two prefaces says about
the aim, strategy or target of the aforementioned uses of Versuch:
* In the Preface to the second edition, in its account of the zweiten Versuch,
Kant describes it as comparing the PRSR to BT so as to determine
whether ‘there is not only compatibility but also unity (Einigkeit)’ (6: 13).
* The Preface to the second edition then refers back to the Preface of the
ﬁrst edition, to what it had to say about ‘this uniﬁcation (Vereinigung),
or the attempt (Versuch) at it’ (6: 13).
* In the Preface to the ﬁrst edition, Kant uses nearly the same language,
explaining that via the Religion ‘the attempt (Versuch) is made for the
ﬁrst time to consider them as united (Vereinigung)’ (6: 10).21
Unfortunately, the pattern here is hidden by the Greene/Hudson and
di Giovanni translations. They vary the English terms used for
Vereinigung, and so do not capture the overlapping accounts of the
Versuch as depicted in both the ﬁrst and second Prefaces. But once we put
aside the translations and look at Kant’s German, it is hard not to take
references to the Versuch as all related to the singular project of
comparing one domain to the other in order to possibly ﬁnd ‘unity’. The
second Preface tells us that the Religion will explore the question of
unity (Einigkeit); it then refers us back to the issue of ‘uniﬁcation’
(Vereinigung), as raised in the ﬁrst Preface; and so as Kant indicates, the ﬁrst
Preface likewise explains that through theReligion ‘the attempt (Versuch) is
made for the ﬁrst time to consider them as united (Vereinigung)’.
Thus the evidence present in the original German strongly supports the
conclusion that the enumerated zweiten Versuch of the second Preface
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refers to the same project as the unenumerated Versuch of the ﬁrst
Preface: they both refer to the project of considering the Einigkeit/
Vereinigung of BT and PRSR. It is just thatVersuch becomes enumerated
as zweiten Versuch in the Preface to the second edition – simply because it
expresses the fact that, through the second edition, the Versuch put
forward by the Religion is being reissued. Kant thus offers by way of the
second edition this zweiten Versuch – this second attempt – at considering
whether there is any ‘unity’ between BT and the PRSR.
In sum: there is no ﬁrst/second experiment distinction whatsoever. There
is merely the ﬁrst iteration of the project as offered in the Religion’s ﬁrst
edition, and its second iteration as offered in the Religion’s second
edition. Whatever else the Religion is doing, whatever testing, compar-
ing, raiding, translating, and so forth, that is for the main body of the text
itself to disclose.
4. Conclusion
Philosophical scholarship evolves slowly. As individuals, many of us look
back at our previous work and cringe at what we thought we then
understood but did not. Likewise, our collective work as scholars faces a
long, even multi-generational maturation cycle. We must not forget this.
We must not forget our role as stewards of a tradition. Errors will, of
course, creep in, but among the key responsibilities we have is to correct
those errors, be they of our own making or those of others. For the less
careful we are, the more mistakes get passed on to later generations.
Scholarship on Kant’s Religion, in particular, is in an especially vulner-
able state, for until very recently, the text (beyond Part One) was seen as
so scandalous (a ‘capitulation’, a body of ‘wobbles’, a ‘failure’) that our
most capable scholars gave it little of their time. Just as political vacuums
make possible the rise of dangerous ideologues, so likewise in the
vacuum of scholarship on the Religion, various tendentious readings can
gain undue recognition. Chris Firestone reports in his response to a
symposium on his In Defense of Kant’s Religion, the following: ‘IDKR
sticks so closely to the text rather than meta-considerations. As much as
interpreters are tempted to ﬁnd something of themselves in Kant, they
must try to resist this urge. IDKR devotes itself to interpreting Kant’s
Religion in a close textual sense in order to minimize this inevitability’
(Firestone 2012: 206).
Firestone, I agree, is correct that many readers are tempted to ﬁnd in Kant
‘something of themselves’. But if that is the case here, so far as I can tell,
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what I have found is an absence, an absence of a distinction, an absence
of a conundrum. To compound this point, I do not think that my
interpretation suggests that the Religion as a whole is to be read any
differently, for the upshot of the view here and the near-consensus view is
still really the same. Except for those who read back into 6: 12 claims just
not there mentioned, it matters very little whether one takes the ersten
Versuch and zweiten Versuch as a distinction between the ﬁrst and
second editions, or a distinction between the initial construction of the
PRSR and then its comparison to BT. Either way, the upshot is the same:
the Religion seeks to compare biblical theology and rational religion. If it
aims for more, for a proof of the deﬁciency of the PRSR, the truth of what
is uniquely found within Christian doctrine, or even whether the project
of the Religion is grounded in the Highest Good, that is not for 6: 12 to
answer. Rather, the Religion is large enough to do many things.22
Notes
1 The so-called ‘afﬁrmative’ reading is one that regards Kant as committed to various
religious doctrines, including, at least, belief in God. There is, however, considerable
debate as to the nature of religious assent in Kant as well as whether the objects of assent
are limited to the practical postulates or expand into more speciﬁcally Christian
doctrines.
2 Di Giovanni translates this as: ‘From this standpoint I can also make this second
experiment’, Pluhar translates it as ‘From this standpoint I can now also make the second
experiment’. Unless otherwise indicated, English quotations will be from the Cambridge
Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, primarily from its 1996 translation of the
Religion.
3 ‘Religion as Translation’ is the label assigned by Firestone and Jacobs to JohnHare’s and
Bernard Reardon’s reading of the Two Experiments. While perhaps not the most
perspicuous title, insofar as others have adopted it, this article will likewise follow the
convention. We will also in the next subsection likewise adopt ‘Religion as Symbol’, the
label assigned by Firestone and Jacobs to Palmquist’s reading.
4 Kant uses various terms beyond ‘pure rational system of religion’ (6: 12), including ‘pure
philosophical doctrine of reason’ (6: 10), ‘pure religion of reason’ (6: 12), and ‘pure
rationalism’ (6: 155). They refer to the body of religious theses that ‘can be convincingly
communicated to everyone’ (6: 103); ‘everyone can be convinced through his reason’
(6: 163). Contrasting terms include: ‘biblical theology’, ‘historical faith’, ‘ecclesiastical
faith’, ‘revealed faith’, the ‘Christian faith’ and so forth. How the latter set relates to the
former set is among the points of dispute within the debate over the Two Experiments.
5 Note that I am here rendering the First Experiment in line with how it is portrayed under
RaT. Hare’s own view on the matter is more ambiguous; and Reardon does not directly
discuss the First/Second Experiment distinction. For reasons that will become clear later,
whatever discrepancies there may be between Hare, Reardon and the constructed
RaT will not be of much signiﬁcance in the end.
6 Palmquist likewise agrees with Firestone and Jacobs that Hare’s interpretation of the
Two Experiments ends up deﬂating the value of the Religion (Palmquist 2015: 34).
7 It is well known that Hare deems the PRSR a ‘failure’ (Hare 1996: 60), though this is
for other reasons than what Firestone and Jacobs claim. Contrary to their accusations,
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RaT does make sense of why Kant would have explored Christian doctrine – and this is
so whether or not in the end Kant’s soteriology is inconsistent. Firestone and Jacobs,
however, just run these two issues together. To make this point more clear: one
could fully agree with RaT’s reading of the Religion as a translation project, while
also challenging how Hare renders Kant’s soteriology. According to Hare, Kant is
(a) committed to a ‘Stoic Maxim’ whereby our moral development depends upon our
powers alone; and yet (b) sets forth in Part One an account of radical evil (original sin)
that makes it impossible for us to overcome our depravity without divine aid. As such,
Hare claims that Kant’s soteriology violates ought implies can. Yet one can reject either
(a) or (b) as an accurate accounting of Kant’s views. Mariña 1997 and, more recently,
Vanden Auweele 2014 reject (a); while Chignell 2011 and Pasternack 2012 reject (b).
8 Kuehn (2001: 45–55) documents various depictions of the Collegium and Kant’s
torments through those years.
9 There are, of course, many who see in the Religion no afﬁrmative religious
commitments, but rather what is essentially just an exposition of religious symbolism.
See e.g. DiCenso 2012.
10 Palmquist distinguishes between what he calls ‘Critical Mysticism’ and the sort of
mysticism that Kant characterizes as a ‘saltomortale’ (8: 398). Insofar as Palmquist intends
any ‘mysticism’ here, I take it that it is the former. Rather than here attempt to explain the
difference, interested readers should consult his many discussions of the topic.
11 Note that Palmquist does not claim that we are incapable of undergoing this
transformation through our own efforts. His claim, rather, is that absent the Gospels
(or perhaps some other record of moral excellence?), we would not believe that it is
possible. This move allows Kant’s Christology to be consistent with a denial of
intercessionary divine aid. Althoughmany have assumed that Kant does permit such aid,
that may not in fact be so. The standard proof-text for Kant’s alleged endorsement of it is
6: 44, but with the exception of Pluhar, other translators fail to capture the subjunctive
mood of the German:Gesetzt, zum Gut-oder Besserwerden sei noch eine übernatürliche
Mitwirkung nöthig. Later in the Religion, Kant rejects ‘foreign inﬂuence to which we
must remain passive’ (6: 118). And all the more overtly in the Conﬂict of the Faculties,
after setting up something of an antinomy between Pietist and Moravian soteriologies,
Kant writes: ‘Yet they are greatly mistaken in this, since on their view the effect of this
power would not be our deed and could not be imputed to us’ (7: 59). In short, we see in
both of these texts the view that moral merit can only be earned through ‘our own work’
(6: 118). This, of course, is not the place to debate the controversies regarding divine aid
and grace in Kant. I have dipped into it mainly for the purposes of indicating that
Palmquist’s reading can save Kant from both a violation of ought implies can as well as
from the criticism levelled against Kant by Hare (see n. 7).
12 When I wrote this article for blind review, I for obvious reasons presented the views of
my 2014 commentary in the third person. I have decided to retain this format rather than
repeatedly entering locutions such as ‘as I formerly held’, ‘my previous view’, etc.
Apologies to those who might ﬁnd this pretentious. My intent is to convey that my 2014
interpretation of the Two Experiments is just one among others that, as I will discuss in
section 3, share a common ﬂaw.
13 Pasternack 2014 also discusses the evaluative principles informing the Second
Experiment, but the BT-PRSR relation is nonetheless the key target of the experiment.
As we will later see, the additional details will not be of much signiﬁcance in the end.
14 Firestone’s point seems to be that the distinctive elements of Christianity, including
original sin, the incarnation and grace, are not pertinent to the Highest Good. Hence, an
exploration of the religious implications of the Highest Good would not on its own call
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for discussion of these topics. Yet it hardly seems controversial to claim that Kant’s
positive philosophy of religion is grounded in the Highest Good. In fact, the
Religion itself opens with a discussion of this topic, one that culminates in the claim
that ‘morality inevitably leads to religion’. Accordingly, Pasternack 2014 presents the
Religion as Kant’s inquiry into the relevance of religion for our practical lives, both with
regard to the rational principles that comprise the PRSR as well the importance of
historical faith as ‘vehicle’ for the PRSR. It is then in light of this that Christianity is
examined, to determine whether it has sufﬁcient ‘unity’ with the PRSR or whether ‘like
oil and water… they would soon have to separate again and let the purely moral religion
(the religion of reason) ﬂoat to the top’ (6: 13).
15 It is unclear why RaA still portrays Kant’s theology as a project of rational religion, for
they overtly maintain that ‘divine revelation is necessary to universal religion’ (6: 155).
As such, they read the Religion under what Kant describes as the ‘supernaturalist’
approach to religion.
16 Firestone and Jacobs are certainly not alone in assuming that Kant’s understanding of
original sin is Augustinian. Yet there is ample evidence to the contrary. For instance,
according to Kant, there is no corruption of ‘the morally legislative reason’ (6: 35), nor does
the ‘human being (even the worst) … repudiate the moral law’ (6: 36). The ‘germ of
goodness’ is thus ‘left in its entire purity’ (6: 45) even though it has been subordinated to self-
love.Hence, Kant’s corollary to original sin is not based upon a lack or privation on our part,
but rather – he makes quite clear – an ‘active and opposing cause’ (6: 57). This is a generally
overlooked but important point, one that came as a result of Kant’s careful deliberations on
the problem of evil in his 1791 ‘Theodicy’. See Gressis forthcoming; Duncan 2012.
17 Consider as well that the alleged First/Second Experiment distinction does not appear in
the Preface to the ﬁrst edition nor anywhere in the main body of the text. Whatever it is
conveying to us, except for Kant having written a second edition wherein we ﬁnd mention
of den zweiten Versuch, we would never have been given any indication that theReligion’s
structure and goals are informed by a division between a First and Second Experiment.
18 As translated by Pluhar: ‘From this standpoint, I can now also make the second
experiment’; and by di Giovanni: ‘From this standpoint, I can also make this second
experiment’.
19 To avoid a possible misunderstanding, I of course am not claiming that ‘experiment’ is
outside the lexical meaning of Versuch. My point is rather that the choice to translate
Versuch as ‘experiment’ here is the culprit – for this choice has led readers to think that
zweiten Versuch points to an important technical distinction, rather than, as I propose,
something far more banal.
20 Readers interested in surveying the corpus more thoroughly can make use of such
databases as Kant-im-Kontext III.
21 I here use the Pluhar translation since di Giovanni does not translate Vereinigung
consistently.
22 As I began to ponder the issues at the foundation of this article, I received generous input
from Werner Pluhar, George di Giovanni and Courtney Fugate. I would also like to
thank Brian Chance for his helpful feedback on an earlier draft.
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